Sunday, December 23, 2007

Dancing Politicos: Texas Monthly Web Press: Fil & Junior John ( the Two Juniors) dont give a hoot about a VA Hospital or Children’s Healthcare, they d

Dancing Politicos: Texas Monthly Web Press: Fil & Junior John ( the Two Juniors) dont give a hoot about a VA Hospital or Children’s Healthcare, they dont care about S TX

On the lamb........
Posted on December 23, 2007 at 07:27:59 AM by Borrego/Laurels Acres sold ....?title


Post 1 December 23, 2007 at 6:02 a.m. (Suggest removal)

What a superficial column! This is never about anything substantive- never discusses any real political issues. This lady is just a groupie at council and commissioner's meetings, reporting the stupid things they do or say.

The last week of the year is when people are making their final decisions to run for office. Something could have been written about attorneys thinking of challenging the rude Judge Longoria or what happened about possible opponents to Juan Garcia but no she'd rather talk about nonsense. If she wants to learn more about what commissioners are thinking when they dress the same perhaps she can do a series hiding out in each politician's closet and watching and listening to them dress- and the Caller - Times can get someone to deal with the more serious issues.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Yes post 1 , it may be superficial , but is that earning the money we paid for them to "work harder"?

How much does faux "cleric" Tyne r Little earn? Enough for him to be elevated by the County Judge to "Reverend, are you all set?"

When did this happen? Dress rehearsal for another Loyd (Insurance) deal perhaps, but it was whatever "Kneel" wanted it to be.

What is 9/10th's of the law? Abandonment?
WACO?!?

This is criminal why does Jaime Powell not report "eminent domain" this crime fraud? Paul Jones & Ennis Joslin land giveaway?

Or the Pat rick Birmingham CCCC discrimination?



"A-B-C.....easy as 1-2-3.....it-is -free, it is wise to remember, no one rides for free.

We can always tell when you lie, your lips move.

Paid to fluff, all that is tough....


I'll take......
Posted on December 23, 2007 at 12:27:41 PM by Jaime Kenedeno



prime rib for 1000 Alex.

I mean, really..... we need to give Alex Garcia the boot and find somebody who will not only unite but to invigorate the State of the County Politics and engage the Citizenry of Nueces County Voters Voting.

We need to realize the one's who profit from division and it is not the average Nueces County Citizen.

We have State of the County events held with the publics money; yet the public was never invited.

We have the hyenas circling and making advances (but we do not see them). They are dressed in Lambs Clothing.






South Texas Chisme: Could it be true, Is Fil Vela involved with Connie Scott?

Treasurer?

TLR hates South Texas, does that include Connie and her Hubby?

WATTS his name? Mike Scott?

The Two Juniors represent not a mainstream Texas but they represent the Transplanted Texans (like Bush) and the Elite Texans (like K.C.Rove).


Junior John will say WATT ever it takes to get re elected.

>Why hasn't anyone gone after Filemon personally as a way to derail Rose?
>If you go to www.fec.gov and follow the instructions on finding out who
>gave to whom, how much, and when, then load up Filemon Vela as an
>Individual Search you'll see he's made significant contributions to two
>notorious politicians. Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA) and Senator Robert
>Menendez (D-NJ). Hunter is an undicted coconspirator in the very same mess
>that sent ex-rep "Duke" Cunningham's ass to prison recently, and Menendez
>is currently under federal investigation for shady real estate dealings by
>renting a building he owns to a non-profit and pocketing $300, 000.00 in
>taxpayer subsidies.



Junior John is working with Fil Vela Jr. & Federal Prosecutors (in the Valley, CC, SA & Houston) to Manufacture White Collar Crime and use it as a Political Strongarm when the Political Strongarm should be accomplishments and the actual construction of a VA Hospital in the Valley.




Junior John has got to figure in this mix and Fil is the inroads (for Cornyn) into South Texas. We need to put a Big Stop Sign up in Robstown and inform them about Connie Scott as I understand Fil Vela is her campaign manager or treasurer and Mike Scott is a TLR guy with a title












Wednesday, November 14, 2007

A Bill for the Creation of a Robstown Nueces County Constitutional Judge?

Sen Bill 1951 of the 80th Leg: 1 District Court with 2 District Attorneys no where else but the 105
Posted on November 14, 2007 at 11:52:34 PM by Jaime Kenedeno



Isn't that like having 2 Attorney Generals for the same state.

Can a County elect 2 County Attorneys

Can a County have 2 County Attorneys for the same county.

ADA's & ACA's are not elected nor are they appointed to serve by the Governor.

I submit the legislation to be illegal, unconstitutional and in violation of election codes, government codes and a circumvention of trickery to spite the failed legislation that attempted to create a new district in Kleberg & Kenedy Counties.

The legislation that created the New District Attorney Position in Kleberg & Kenedy County must be challenged.

There is only one district.

There can only exist 1 District Attorney per District.

"Anything else, would be uncivilized"

Senate Bill 1951 of the 80th Legislature

Political Bigomy After All Karl Rove is From Utah
Posted on November 15, 2007 at 00:41:33 AM by Jaime Kenedeno



Is it not illegal for two to be espoused to one?

Think we can legislate another Congressional Rep for the 27th Cong Dist to help Solomon with the "backlog" of legislation in the applicable counties.

The precedent has been created get busy and start exploiting it.

A Robstown Nueces County Constitutional Judge?

Create a County Constitutional Judge's office for both Robstown & Calallen/Annavile, and get Gov. Rick Perry to give the nod to Patti or Randolph Boothe or Sam Keech as first County Constitutional Judge of Robstown & Calallen/Annaville.


Political Bigomy After All Karl Rove is From Utah
Posted on November 15, 2007 at 00:41:33 AM by Jaime Kenedeno



Is it not illegal for two to be espoused to one?

Think we can legislate another Congressional Rep for the 27th Cong Dist to help Solomon with the "backlog" of legislation in the applicable counties.

The precedent has been created get busy and start exploiting it.

A Robstown Nueces County Constitutional Judge?

Create a County Constitutional Judge's office for both Robstown & Calallen/Annavile, and get Gov. Rick Perry to give the nod to Patti or Randolph Boothe or Sam Keech as first County Constitutional Judge of Robstown & Calallen/Annaville.


Potential Juror 26........
Posted on November 15, 2007 at 00:59:29 AM by d1

was told "Just trying to stay out of trouble"....LIAR...because If you were "you lied"!

Go back to Iraq where they need your kind of prosecution......I forgot your Farsi/Arabic sucks.

"Your Honor, I'm gonna have to spend the rest of the summer in the library"

More like the rest of your life......Your hate is well documented as you can READ English, do you understand/comprehend English?

TLR/Totally Live Recognition........Now, Dick Cheney can shoot who he pleases and whenever he choices to.

With you in his pocket....no need to utilize Jaime Powell.
WATT is the Number of the Judicial District for this so called District Attorney
Posted on November 15, 2007 at 01:21:39 AM by Jaime Kenedeno

Sec. 43.182. DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR KLEBERG AND KENEDY
COUNTIES. (a) The voters of Kleberg and Kenedy Counties elect a
district attorney. The district attorney has the same powers and
duties as other district attorneys and serves the district courts
of Kleberg and Kenedy Counties.
(b) The district attorney shall attend each term and session
of the district courts of Kleberg and Kenedy Counties and shall
represent the state in criminal cases pending in those courts. The
district attorney has control of any case heard on petition of writ
of habeas corpus before any district or inferior court in the
district.

(c) The commissioners courts of the counties comprising the
district may supplement the state salary of the district attorney.
The amount of the supplement may not exceed $12,000 a year. The
supplemental salary must be paid proportionately by the
commissioners court of each county according to the population of
the county. The supplemental salary may be paid from the officers'
salary fund of a county. If that fund is inadequate, the
commissioners court may transfer the necessary funds from the
general fund of the county.


The Legislation Failed but if you notice the language is the same
Posted on November 15, 2007 at 01:26:39 AM by Jaime Kenedeno



Sec.i24.567.ii423RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT (KENEDY AND KLEBERG COUNTIES). (a) The 423rd Judicial District is composed of Kenedy and Kleberg Counties.

(b)iiThe 423rd District Court shall give preference to criminal cases.

(c)iiIn addition to other jurisdiction provided by law, the 423rd District Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the county courts in Kenedy and Kleberg Counties and the statutory county court in Kleberg County over all matters of civil and criminal

3832 79th Legislature — Regular Session 79th Day

jurisdiction, original and appellate, in cases over which a county court has jurisdiction under the constitution and laws of this state. Matters and proceedings in the concurrent jurisdiction of the 423rd District Court and the county court or county court at law may be filed in either court and all cases of concurrent jurisdiction may be transferred between the 423rd District Court, the county court, and the county court at law. However, a case may not be transferred from one court to another without the consent of the judge of the court to which it is transferred, and a case may not be transferred unless it is within the jurisdiction of the court to which it is transferred.

(b)iiSection 24.207, Government Code, is amended to read as follows:

Sec.i24.207.ii105TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ([KENEDY, KLEBERG, AND] NUECES COUNTY [COUNTIES]). (a) The 105th Judicial District is composed of [Kenedy, Kleberg, and] Nueces County [counties]. The court shall give preference to criminal cases.

(b)iiThe terms of the 105th District Court begin[:

[(1)iiin Kenedy County on the first Mondays in June and December;

[(2)iiin Kleberg County on the first Mondays in April and October; and

[(3)iiin Nueces County] on the first Mondays in February and August.

(c)iiThe judge, with the approval of the commissioners court, may appoint an official interpreter of the court [in Nueces County] who serves at the will of the judge. The official interpreter shall take both the constitutional oath of office and an oath that he will faithfully interpret all testimony in the district court as official interpreter. The oath is sufficient for his service as official interpreter in all cases in the court [in Nueces County] during the interpreter's term of office. The judge may also assign the official interpreter to assist the court's probation officer in the discharge of the probation officer's duties.

(c)iiThe heading to Section 43.148, Government Code, is amended to read as follows:

Sec.i43.148.iiKENEDY, KLEBERG, AND NUECES COUNTIES [105TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT].

(d)iiSubsections (a) and (c), Section 43.148, Government Code, are amended to read as follows:

(a)iiThe voters of Kenedy, Kleberg, and Nueces counties [the 105th Judicial District] elect a district attorney. The district attorney has the same powers and duties as other district attorneys and serves all the district, county, and justice courts of Nueces County and the district courts of Kleberg and Kenedy counties.

(c)iiThe commissioners courts of Kenedy, Kleberg, and Nueces [the] counties [comprising the district] may supplement the state salary of the district attorney. The amount of the supplement may not exceed $12,000 a year. The supplemental salary must be paid proportionately by the commissioners court of each county according to the population of the county. The supplemental salary may be paid from the officers' salary fund of a county. If that fund is inadequate, the commissioners court may transfer the necessary funds from the general fund of the county.

(e)iiThe local administrative district judge shall transfer all cases from Kenedy and Kleberg Counties that are pending in the 105th District Court on September 1, 2005, to the 423rd District Court.

Thursday, May 26, 2005 SENATE JOURNAL 3833

(f)iiWhen a case is transferred as provided by Subsection (e) of this section, all processes, writs, bonds, recognizances, or other obligations issued from the 105th District Court are returnable to the 423rd District Court as if originally issued by that court. The obligees on all bonds and recognizances taken in and for the 105th District Court and all witnesses summoned to appear in the 105th District Court are required to appear before the 423rd District Court as if originally required to appear before that court.

(g)iiThe 423rd Judicial District is created September 1, 2005.

SECTIONi7.ii(a)iiEffective January 1, 2007, Subchapter C, Chapter 24, Government Code, is amended by adding Section 24.569 to read as follows:

Failed Creation of the 423rd District

Why did they try to create the 423rd Judcial District?
Posted on November 15, 2007 at 01:36:58 AM by Jaime Kenedeno



Sounds like how Hitler thought

Did they think they needed a new Judicial District to create the new District Attorney position?

We have here in this situation a District Attorney without a Judicial District.

Tell me I am wrong and back it up, any takers?



Sunday, November 11, 2007

Writ of Mandamus: to do or forbear from doing some specific act which that body is obliged under law to do or refrain from doing

Mandamus

A writ of mandamus or simply mandamus, which means "we command" in Latin, is the name of one of the prerogative writs in the common law, and is issued by a superior court to compel a lower court or a government officer to perform mandatory or purely ministerial duties correctly.[1]

Mandamus is a judicial remedy which is in the form of an order from a superior court to any government, subordinate court, corporation or public authority to do or forbear from doing some specific act which that body is obliged under law to do or refrain from doing, as the case may be, and which is in the nature of public duty and in certain cases of a statutory duty.[2] It cannot be issued to compel an authority to do something against statutory provision.

Mandamus can be supplemented by the statement that it is not only the command to do but also a command not to do a particular thing against the rights of the petitioner. Mandamus is supplemented by legal rights. It must be a judicially enforceable and legally protected right before one suffering a legal grievance can ask for a mandamus. A person can be said to be aggrieved only when he is denied a legal right by someone who has a legal duty to do something and abstains from doing it.


The applicant pleading for the writ of mandamus to be enforced should be able to show that he has a legal right to compel the respondent to do or refrain from doing the specific act. The duty sought to be enforced must have two qualities:[3]

  1. It must be a duty of public nature
  2. The duty must be imperative and should not be discretionary.

Normally, a writ of mandamus does not issue to, or an order in the nature of mandamus is not made against, the private individual. It is not necessary that the person or the authority on whom the statutory duty is imposed be a public official or an official body. A mandamus can issue, for instance, to an official of a society to compel him to carry out the terms of the statute under or by which the society is constituted or governed and also to companies or corporations to carry out duties placed on them by the statutes authorizing their undertakings. A mandamus would be equally applicable for a company constituted by a statute for the purposes of fulfilling public responsibilities. The court to which the application for the issue of mandamus is made will not constitute itself a court of appeal from the decision of the administrative authority and will not examine the correctness or otherwise of a decision on merits.[4] The exercise of administrative discretion is not interfered upon by the court, but it will do so if there has been an illegal exercise of the discretion. There is an illegal exercise of discretion where:

  1. The order is made without, or in excess of jurisdiction
  2. The order made is mala fides, or
  3. The authority is influenced by extraneous consideration.


History of Mandamus

The writ of mandamus is of a very ancient origin, dating back at the latest to the times of Edward II.[5] It seems originally to have been one of that large classes of writs by which the Sovereign of England directed the performance of any desired act by his subjects, the word "missive" in such writs and letters, having given rise to the present name of the writ. These letters, missives or mandates, to which the generic term mandamus was applied, were in no sense judicial writs but were merely commands issuing directly from the sovereign to the subject without the intervention of the court. The writ in the shape of these commands, however, became obsolete at a very early stage and gradually it came to be confined to the judicial writ issued by the King's Bench which has by steady growth developed into the writ of mandamus, which is, in general, a command issuing in the King's name from the Court of King's bench and directed to any person, corporation or inferior court of jurisdiction within the King's Dominions requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified which appertains to their office and duty, and which the Court of King's bench has previously determined, or at least supposes to be a consonant to right and justice. It is high prerogative writ of a most extensive remedial nature... And issues in all cases where a party has a right to have anything done, and hath no other specific means of compelling its performance.[6]

Purpose of Mandamus

The purpose of mandamus is to remedy defects of justice. It lies in the cases where there is a specific right but no specific legal remedy for enforcing that right. It also lies in cases where there is an alternative remedy but the mode of redress is less convenient, less beneficial or less effectual. Generally, it is not available in anticipation of any injury except when the petitioner is likely to be affected by an official act in contravention of a statutory duty or where an illegal or unconstitutional order is made. The grant of mandamus is a matter for the discretion of the court, the exercise of which is governed by well-settled principles.[7]

Mandamus, being a discretionary remedy, the application for that must be made in good faith and not for indirect purposes. Acquiescence cannot, however, bar the issue of mandamus. The petitioner must, of course, satisfy the Court that he has the legal right to the performance of the legal duty as distinct from mere discretion of authority.[8]

A mandamus is normally issued when an officer or an authority by compulsion of statute is required to perform a duty and which despite demand in writing has not been performed. In no other case will a writ of mandamus issue unless it be to quash an illegal order.

Kinds of Mandamus

There are essentially three kinds of Mandamus:

  1. Alternative Mandamus: A mandamus issued upon the first application for relief, commanding the defendant either to perform the act demanded or to appear before the court at a specified time to show cause for not performing it.
  2. Peremptory Mandamus: An absolute and unqualified command to the defendant to do the act in question. It is issued when the defendant defaults on, or fails to show sufficient cause in answer to, an alternative mandamus.[9] [10]
  3. Continuing Mandamus: A Mandamus issued to a lower authority in general public interest asking the officer or the authority to perform its tasks expeditiously for an unstipulated period of time for preventing miscarriage of justice.[11]

Mandamus in the United States


In general

In the administrative law context in the United States, the requirement that mandamus can be used only to compel a ministerial act that has largely been abandoned. By statute or by judicial expansion of the writ of mandamus in most of the U.S. states, acts of administrative agencies are now subject to judicial review for abuse of discretion. Judicial review of agencies of the United States federal government for abuse of discretion is authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act.

Federal courts

The power of the Supreme Court of the United States to issue a writ of mandamus outside its appellate jurisdiction was the controversy that led the Court to delve into the much more significant issue of judicial review in the famed case of Marbury v. Madison. In modern practice, the Court has effectively abolished the issuance of mandamus and other prerogative writs although it theoretically retains the power to do so.

In the context of mandamus from a United States Court of Appeals to a United States District Court, the Supreme Court has ruled that the appellate courts have discretion to issue mandamus to control an abuse of discretion by the lower court in unusual circumstances, where there is a compelling reason not to wait for an appeal from a final judgment. This discretion is exercised very sparingly.

The authority of the United States district courts to issue mandamus has been expressly abrogated by Rule 81(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but relief in the nature of mandamus can be had by other remedies provided for in the Rules, where provided by statute, or by use of the District Court's equitable powers.

State courts

In some state-court systems, however, mandamus has evolved into a general procedure for discretionary appeals from nonfinal trial-court decisions.

In some U.S. states, including California, the writ is now called mandate instead of mandamus, and may be issued by any level of the state court system to any lower court or to any government official. It is still common for Californians to bring "taxpayer actions" against public officials for wasting public funds through mismanagement of a government agency, where the relief sought is a writ of mandate compelling the official to stop wasting money and fulfill his duty to protect the public fisc.

Other states, including New York, have replaced mandamus (as well as the other prerogative writs) with statutory procedures. In New York, this is known as an Article 78 review after the civil procedure law provision that created the statutory procedure.



Sunday, October 14, 2007

Keller should be removed for "Her actions also brought the integrity of the Texas judiciary and of her court in just a tipof the iceburg dead ahead...

Wednesday, October 10, 2007
Complaint to be filed against Judge Sharon Keller with Commission on Judicial Conduct: With Michael Richard's death, did she go too far?

All I can say is it's about time. A reader emails to report:

there will be a press conference at 1:30 PM Wednesday, Oct 10, in front of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to announce the filing of a complaint with the State Commission on Judicial Conduct against Sharon Keller.

Jim Harrington, director of the Texas Civil Rights Project and Scott Cobb, of Texas Moratorium Network, will be present, along with others.

This couldn't be more justified after the stunt Keller pulled recently, refusing to extend the deadline on a death penalty appeal when the defendant's lawyers' computer malfunctioned. Her fellow CCA judges didn't know about the decision, including the judge assigned to evaluate the case who stayed late after work on the assumption the appeal would be coming. This wasn't just a petty decision by Keller, it was an outright abuse of power in a life or death decision, usurping the rightful authority of both her colleagues and the US Supreme Court. It was not an "incompetent" decision, it was a nasty and mean-spirited one.

The "Queen of Mean" deserves the formal complaint, and if Texas judges are to retain public confidence and credibility in the legal community, the Commission should sustain the complaint and sanction Judge Keller harshly. If I had my druthers, I think she should be removed from the bench because of her consistently bad record over the years. According to the Frequently Asked Questions page on on the Commission's website, the Commission may issue sanctions on its own, but it may also:

request that the Supreme Court of Texas suspend a judge under the provisions of Rule 15(b) of the Procedural Rules for Removal of Retirement of Judges. Rule 15(b) states, Upon filing with the Commission of a sworn complaint charging a person holding such office with willful or persistent violation of rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Texas, incompetence in performing the duties of office, willful violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, or willful and persistent conduct that is clearly inconsistent with the proper performance of his duties or cases public discredit upon the judiciary or the administration of justice, the Commission, after giving the person notice and an opportunity to appear and be heard before the Commission (under the provisions of Rule 6), may recommend to the Supreme Court the suspension of such person from office.

That course of action sounds like exactly what's needed to restore credibility and integrity to Texas' highest criminal court. Keller is not up for re-election until 2012, but Texans shouldn't have to wait that long to remove this judicial cancer from our midst.

MORE: See initial coverage from the Houston Chronicle, featuring Judge Keller pointing the finger at everyone but the one person who made the decision that ended Michael Richard's life prematurely - herself. Reported the Chronicle:

Twenty lawyers from across Texas today filed a formal judicial conduct complaint against Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Presiding Judge Sharon Keller, accusing her of violating the constitutional due process of a condemned man.

The complaint to the State Commission on Judicial Conduct says Keller improperly cut off appeals that led to the execution of Michael Richard on Sept. 25 despite the fact the U.S. Supreme Court earlier in the day had accepted a case on the propriety of lethal injection, which had direct implications for Richard's execution.

"Judge Keller's actions denied Michael Richard two constitutional rights, access to the courts and due process, which led to his execution," the complaint states. "Her actions also brought the integrity of the Texas judiciary and of her court into disrepute and was a source of scandal to the citizens of the state."

Those lawyers signing the complaint included former State Bar President Broadus Spivey, Houston criminal defense lawyer Dick DeGuerin, University of Houston law professor Mike Olivas, former appellate Judge Michol O'Connor, state Rep. Harold Dutton, D-Houston, and former Nueces County Attorney Mike Westergren.

UPDATE: The full text of the complaint is now available here.

Posted by Gritsforbreakfast at 12:46 PM

Labels: CCA, Death penalty, Judiciary

7 comments:

Anonymous said...

The Houston Chronicle has another quote from Judge Cheryl Johnson in their story covering today's filing.

Judge Cheryl Johnson was the appeals court jurist in charge of Richard's case. She said she never heard anything about the clerk's office closing off the appeal until the following day.

"I wasn't consulted," Johnson said. "I have been here almost nine years. My understanding was that on a death case we were here up until the time of the execution and we would take filings that came in up until 6 o'clock and the execution is underway."

Johnson said it is not a question of whether Richard is guilty but did he have the right to appeal."

End of Chronicle excerpt.

The Code of Judicial Conduct says that, "a judge who receives information clearly establishing that another judge has committed a violation of this Code should take appropriate action. A judge having knowledge that another judge has committed a violation of this Code that raises a substantial question as to the other judge's fitness for office shall inform the State Commission on Judicial Conduct or take other appropriate action."

From the way, Judge Johnson has been quoted in the media, it sounds like she believes Keller's behavior was innappropriate at the least. If she also believes that it violates the Code of Judicial Conduct, then she is ethically obligated to take action.
10/10/2007 03:34:00 PM
Anonymous said...

In some of the earlier articles on this case, I remember reading several ethics scholars who stated that Keller's refusal to extend the hours of operation for the clerk did not violate any specific ethical rule. The Commission cannot sanction a judge just for doing something they don't like, it has to violate a canon of their code. Anyone know what canon the complaint is going to allege to have been violated?
10/10/2007 03:54:00 PM
Anonymous said...

While we're at it, maybe the Texas Defender Service should be grieved. DP lawyers love to play this brinksmanship game of waiting until the last minute to file their habeas petitions, knowing their chances of getting a stay will be increased if the other side doesn't get to respond.

Sure, it's a nice advantage, but it's a gamble. You don't know if something bad is going to happen at the last minute that might prevent your incredible, Brandeis-like piece of legal gold from saving your client's neck.

Yeah, I know the SCt took cert in the Kentucky case that day, but it's not like this is some novel legal theory. It's been batted around for several years nationally and in Texas for at least the last couple of years.

So waiting until 3 pm the day your client is going to die doesn't seem like the greatest use of time management.
10/10/2007 04:09:00 PM
PersianCowboy said...

To close at 5 PM and refuse to accept an appeal by a person about to be executed is a violation of judicial responsibility. When a person is about to be executed, our state's highest criminal court needs to remain open for business. Keller should resign or be impeached and removed from office for her unethical conduct. This is not the first time that Keller has behaved like a buffoon. According to Tom Price, one of the other conservative judges on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, as far back as 2001 she made Texas' highest criminal appeals court "a national laughingstock." As long as Keller is in office, the people of Texas can not be sure that justice is being done with integrity.
10/11/2007 01:59:00 AM
Michael said...

This is one reason I always sign my name to comments. anonymous (10/10. 3:54 p.m.) says there are "some other articles" where "several ethics scholars" state that Judge Keller "did not violate any specific rule". Could you be a little more obtuse, please? Maybe instead of hearsay within hearsay, you could try to embed hearsay within hearsay within hearsay. What ethics scholars? I believe Newt Gingrich considers himself an ethics scholar. In light of the Complaint's citation to four specific Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, I'll take the word of the signatories -- including a past State Bar of Texas President, as well as the most visible criminal attorney in Texas, Dick DeGuerin.

By the way, can we dispense with referring to "The Honorable Sharon Keller" now?
10/11/2007 10:26:00 AM
PJ or said...

I know this is going to seem like a long statement but if you're going to impeach a judge you'd better know you're state's rules!

Defendant's in this case under color of law and who have caused the constitutional deprivation which was their policy and procedure to do so are not immune, not even under qualified immunity.
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY TO BAD BEHAVIOR:
Therefore the JUDGE IS NOT IMMUNE TO ARREST BECAUSE THE ONLY PERSONS WHO HAVE LIMITED IMMUNITY is Senators and Representatives, coming and going and while in session, and that is limited. If they commit Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, they maybe arrested in session.

a. TITLE 28 > PART I > CHAPTER 21 > § 454 Practice of law by justices and judges
Any justice or judge appointed under the authority of the United States who engages in the practice of law is guilty of a high misdemeanor.

Constitution Section. 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place.

h. TITLE 28--JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART I--ORGANIZATION OF COURTS CHAPTER 21--GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO COURTS AND JUDGES Sec. 453. Oaths of justices and judges Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: ``I, ___ ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.''

i. TITLE 28 > PART I > CHAPTER 17 > § 372. Retirement for disability; substitute judge on failure to retire (a) Any justice or judge of the United States appointed to hold office during good behavior who becomes permanently disabled from performing his duties may retire from regular active service, and the President shall, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint a successor. Any justice or judge of the United States desiring to retire under this section shall certify to the President his disability in writing.

TEXAS CONSTITUTION ON IMPEACHMENT:
Article 15 - IMPEACHMENT
Section 4 - JUDGMENT; INDICTMENT, TRIAL, AND PUNISHMENT
Judgment in cases of impeachment shall extend only to removal from office, and disqualification from holding any office of honor, trust or profit under this State. A party convicted on impeachment shall also be subject to indictment, trial and punishment according to law.


§ 665.002. INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY BE IMPEACHED. An individual may be removed from an office or a position by impeachment in the manner provided by the constitution and this chapter if the individual is:
(1) a state officer;
(2) a head of a state department or state institution; or
(3) a member, regent, trustee, or commissioner having control or management of a state institution or enterprise.

§ 665.052. CAUSES FOR REMOVAL. (a) An individual may be removed from office by address for:
(1) Willful neglect of duty;
(2) Incompetence;
(3) Habitual drunkenness;
(4) Oppression in office;
(5) Breach of trust; or
(6) any other reasonable cause that is not a sufficient ground for impeachment.
(b) In this section, "incompetence" means:
(1) Gross ignorance of official duties;
(2) Gross carelessness in the discharge of official duties; or
(3) Inability or unfitness to discharge promptly and properly official duties because of a serious physical or mental defect that did not exist at the time of the officer's election.


TEXAS CHAPTER 39. ABUSE OF OFFICE § 39.01. DEFINITIONS.
(1) "Law relating to a public servant's office or employment" means a law that specifically applies to a person acting in the capacity of a public servant and that directly or indirectly:
(A) imposes a duty on the public servant; or
(B) governs the conduct of the public servant.
(2) "Misuse" means to deal with property contrary to:
(A) an agreement under which the public servant holds the property;
(B) a contract of employment or oath of office of a public servant;
(C) a law, including provisions of the General Appropriations Act specifically relating to government property, that prescribes the manner of custody or disposition of the property; or
(D) a limited purpose for which the property is delivered or received.

TEXAS § 39.02. ABUSE OF OFFICIAL CAPACITY.
(a) A public servant commits an offense if, with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or defraud another, he intentionally or knowingly:
(1) violates a law relating to the public servant's office or employment; or
(2) misuses government property, services, personnel, or any other thing of value belonging to the government that has come into the public servant's custody or possession by virtue of the public servant's office or employment.
(b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(c) An offense under Subsection (a)(2) is:
(1) a Class C misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is less than $20;
(2) a Class B misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is $20 or more but less than $500 ;
(3) a Class A misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is $500 or more but less than $1,500;
(4) a state jail felony if the value of the use of the thing misused is $1,500 or more but less than $20,000;
(5) a felony of the third degree if the value of the use of the thing misused is $20,000 or more but less than $100,000;
(6) a felony of the second degree if the value of the use of the thing misused is $100,000 or more but less than $200,000; or
(7) a felony of the first degree if the value of the use of the thing misused is $200,000 or more.
(d) A discount or award given for travel, such as frequent flyer miles, rental car or hotel discounts, or food coupons, are not things of value belonging to the government for purposes of this section due to the administrative difficulty and cost involved in recapturing the discount or award for a governmental entity.

ANSWER TO IMMUNITY

This means ALL JUDGES! The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution. Impeachment is the ONLY crime that maybe charged without a Trial by JURY!
10/11/2007 09:24:00 PM
Anonymous said...

I practice appellate law, mostly civil cases. I've been involved in dozen of "emergency" matters over the years. Every time a computer glitch, traffic or anything else has contributed to a brief getting to the courthouse after 5 p.m. the court has accomodated us -- and no one was about to die, with his procedural rights irretrievably lost.

If Texas courts can routinely offer relief in matters of money or family disputes, for Keller to not do so in a matter of death is despicable.
10/11/2007 10:49:00 PM

Post a Comment

Monday, September 03, 2007

Re(3): Abhor what is evil; hold fast to what is good.
Posted on June 23, 2007 at 04:11:40 AM by 4 ringo......you know watt.......

Jules: Wanna know what I'm buyin' Ringo?
Pumpkin: What?
Jules: Your life. I'm givin' you that money so I don't hafta kill your ass. You read the Bible?
Pumpkin: Not regularly.
Jules: There's a passage I got memorized. Ezekiel 25:17. The path of the righteous man is beset on all sides by the inequities of the selfish and the tyranny of evil men. Blessed is he who, in the name of charity and good will, shepherds the weak through the valley of the darkness. For he is truly his brother's keeper and the finder of lost children. And I will strike down upon thee with great vengeance and furious anger those who attempt to poison and destroy my brothers. And you will know I am the Lord when I lay my vengeance upon you. I been sayin' that shit for years. And if you ever heard it, it meant your ass. I never really questioned what it meant. I thought it was just a cold-blooded thing to say to a motherfucker before you popped a cap in his ass. But I saw some shit this mornin' made me think twice. Now I'm thinkin': it could mean you're the evil man. And I'm the righteous man. And Mr. 9mm here, he's the shepherd protecting my righteous ass in the valley of darkness. Or it could be you're the righteous man and I'm the shepherd and it's the world that's evil and selfish. I'd like that. But that shit ain't the truth. The truth is you're the weak. And I'm the tyranny of evil men. But I'm tryin', Ringo. I'm tryin' real hard to be a shepherd.

Tuesday, August 07, 2007

Anne Armstrong was a Halliburton director when that corporation hired Cheney. She is Kay Bailey Hutchison�s best friend, having helped ...............

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CALLER.COM
ORG SOURCE: Vice President accidentally shoots lawyer
Sun Feb 12, 2006 23:53



Vice President accidentally shoots lawyer

http://www.caller.com/

Vice President Dick Cheney accidentally sprayed Austin lawyer Harry Whittington in the face and chest with shotgun pellets at the Armstrong Ranch on Saturday. Whittington is in stable condition at Christus Spohn in Corpus Christi.
BREAKING NEWS Cheney's shotgun pellets sprayed fellow hunter at Armstrong Ranch
Vice President Dick Cheney accidentally shot Austin attorney and Armstrong family friend Harry Whittington with shotgun pellets while hunting for quail at about 5:30 p.m. Saturday at the Kenedy County ranch
FULL STORY »
http://www.caller.com/ccct/local_news/article/0,1641,CCCT_811_4461615,00.html

MORE ON ARMSTRONG RANCH
Ranch leader Tobin Armstrong
http://www.caller.com/ccct/local_news/article/0,1641,CCCT_811_4143236,00.html

USGS GNIS (GNIS)
Armstrong Ranch Airport. Feature Type:, airport. Elevation (feet):, 27. Description:, Facility is located 2 mi NE from Armstrong. State:, Texas ...
HTTP://geonames.usgs.gov/pls/gnis/web_query.GetDetail?tab=Y&id=1386171




Location of Armstrong Ranch Airport, Texas


This information is provided by Texans for Public Justice.

Go to our searchable Ranger and Pioneer database

Name Mr. & Mrs. Tobin Armstrong
Appointed To
Industry Agriculture
Employer Armstrong Ranch
Occupation Owner
Address Armstrong, TX 78338
Status for 2000 Pledged to raise $100,000
Status for 2004 not listed
Profile
Pioneer Tobin Armstrong�s ancestor, Texas Ranger John B. Armstrong, bought the beginnings of the Armstrong Ranch in 1882 with the $4,000 bounty he received for capturing outlaw John Wesley Hardin. In 1944 Tobin�s older brother wed an heir of legendary King Ranch (see Fausto Yturria), linking two of the biggest ranches in Texas. The Armstrong Ranch has since gone global, with tracts in Australia and South America. In recent years, Tobin and his wife, Anne, have hosted many GOP dignitaries--including the first and second President Bush--on their 50,000-acre Armstrong Ranch in South Texas. �We go out when the dew is still on the grass, and then hunt until we shoot our limit,� Tobin said in 2000 of his ranch outings with Dick Cheney. �Then we pick a fine spot and have a wild game picnic lunch.� True conservatives might choke on their javelina steaks if they knew that Tobin Armstrong dunned the government for $11,336 in farm subsidies between 1995 and 2002, according to the Environmental Working Group. Anne Armstrong served as: a close advisor to President Nixon; President Ford�s British Ambassador; and approved covert actions on the President�s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under Reagan. A veteran of blue-chip corporate boards, Anne Armstrong was a Halliburton director when that corporation hired Cheney. She is Kay Bailey Hutchison�s best friend, having helped launch the senator�s career as Republican National Committee co-chair in 1971. George W. Bush appointed Anne Armstrong as a Texas A&M regent in 1997. She and her husband were part of Laura Bush�s delegation to the funeral of Queen Mother Elizabeth in 2002. As a Kenedy County Commissioner in 2001, Tobin Armstrong expressed serious reservations about a short-lived Bush administration plan to relocate a Navy bomb-testing site from Puerto Rico to the fragile sand dunes of a local beach. Daughter Katharine Armstrong--formerly Katherine Idsal--and ex-son-in-law Warren Idsal also are Pioneers. President Bush invited Tobin, Anne and Katharine Armstrong to a White House sleepover.
http://www.whitehouseforsale.org/ContributorsAndPaybacks/pioneer_profile.cfm?pioneer_ID=509

South Texas Natives - Advisory Group & Technical Committee
Advisory Group. Co-chairs:. Katharine Armstrong, Armstrong Ranch; Will Harte, Cerrito Prieto Ranch. Members:. James F. Anderson, Haas-Anderson Construction, ...
HTTP://www.southtexasnatives.org/advisors/

Daughter Katharine Armstrong--formerly Katherine Idsal--and ex-son-in-law Warren Idsal
http://www.whitehouseforsale.org/ContributorsAndPaybacks/pioneer_profile.cfm?pioneer_ID=622

This information is provided by Texans for Public Justice.

Go to our searchable Ranger and Pioneer database
Name Warren Bruce Idsal
Appointed To
Industry Insurance
Employer UICI Co's
Occupation Ex-Vice President
Address Dallas, TX 75205
Status for 2000 Pledged to raise $100,000
Status for 2004 not listed
Profile
Warren Idsal and Katharine Armstrong both worked for major investment firms at the time of their 1982 wedding, with the Paine Webber (see Joseph Grano) groom marrying a Smith Barney bride. During the 2000 Bush campaign the then-married couple still romantically shared a common Pioneer tracking number. Katharine is the daughter of Pioneer Tobin Armstrong, an heir to the fabled Armstrong and King Ranch fortunes. Her mother, Anne Armstrong, who is Kay Bailey Hutchison�s best friend, helped launch the senator�s career as Republican National Committee co-chair in 1971. As Texas Treasurer in the early 1990s, Kay Bailey Hutchison returned the favor by hiring Armstrong�s son-in-law, Warren Idsal, as a top aide. But Hutchison fired him after a short tenure. Warren Idsal also was an executive at health and life insurer United Insurance Companies (UICI) for several years in the late 1990s. Then-Governor George W. Bush appointed Katharine Idsal to the Texas Parks and Wildlife Commission in 1999. The Idsals divorced and Katharine reclaimed her maiden name after Bush�s gubernatorial successor appointed Katharine chair of the commission. This heir apparent to the Armstrong Ranch resigned her state post in 2003, citing her need to make a living for her three children. Armstrong cited lobbying as one possible career move.

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Friday, July 27, 2007

We note that neither party explains who Mr. Gonzalez might be.....hmmmmmm

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NUMBER 13-06-035-CV


COURT OF APPEALS


THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS


CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG



TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellant,


v.


ROEL OLIVARES, Appellee.



On appeal from the 404th District Court

of Cameron County, Texas.



MEMORANDUM OPINION


Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza, and Benavides

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez


Appellant, the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS), appeals from the trial court's order expunging the arrest of appellee, Roel Olivares, from all public records. By two issues, DPS contends (1) that the trial court issued the expunction order in error because Olivares presented no evidence to support the expunction, and (2) that the court abused its discretion in resetting the expunction hearing without notice. We reverse and render.

I. Background

Olivares was arrested for driving while intoxicated, see Tex. Penal Code Ann. � 49.04 (Vernon 2003), and pled guilty to the charge. The trial court sentenced Olivares to twelve months' incarceration and ordered him to pay a $100 fine. The trial court suspended Olivares's sentence and placed him on probation for a period of twelve months.

Olivares later filed a petition to expunge his arrest from public records. The trial court set a hearing on Olivares's expunction petition for September 1, 2005. Pursuant to article 55.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial court sent notice of the petition and the September 1st hearing date to all parties believed to possess records of Olivares's arrest. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.02 (Vernon 2006). Both DPS and the Cameron County District Attorney filed an answer and special exceptions to the petition.

On September 1st, the date of the originally scheduled hearing on the expunction petition, the court signed an order setting a hearing for September 29th. The trial court's docket entry for September 1st reflects that (1) the September 29th hearing was related to the district attorney's special exceptions, and (2) the hearing on the expunction petition was reset for October 20th per the agreement of the parties.

The following reflects the complete transcription of the September 29th hearing:

The Court: Mr. de la Fuente, on your expunction, I'm just going to sign the order.


Defense Counsel: Very Well.


The Court: On 2005-07-3649, Olivares.


Defense Counsel: Yes, Your Honor.


The Court: All right.

Defense Counsel: Thank you, Judge. Let me make sure there is an order there, if not I'll get one to the Court.


The Court: They withdrew the special exception to this case and Mr. Gonzalez came in and I told him - - he told me that there would be an agreement and that they would withdraw their special exception and so I informed him that it was not necessary for him to appear.


Defense Counsel: Very well.


The Court: There is no opposition.


Defense Counsel: We ask the court to sign the order then, Judge.


The Court: I think you are going to have to get me one.


Defense Counsel: I will. (1)


The trial court signed an order of expunction on October 3rd and an amended order of expunction on October 13th. DPS moved for a new trial, arguing that no evidence was presented by Olivares and that Olivares was not entitled to the expunction as a matter of law. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal ensued.

II. No Evidence

By its first issue, DPS contends that the trial court erred in granting Olivares's petition for expunction because Olivares presented no evidence to satisfy the statutory requirements for expunction. We agree.

A. Standard of Review

A trial court's order in an expunction proceeding is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Heine v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 92 S.W.3d 642, 646 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied). The trial court must strictly comply with the statutory procedures for expunction, and it commits reversible error when it fails to do so. Ex parte Stiles, 958 S.W.2d 414, 418 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, pet. denied).

In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we "view the evidence in the light favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not." City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807, 827 (Tex. 2005). We will sustain a no evidence challenge when the record shows that (1) there is a complete absence of a vital fact, (2) the court is barred from considering the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla, or (4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact. Id. at 810 (citing Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 361, 362-63 (1960)); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Williams, 76 S.W.3d 647, 649 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.)

B. Applicable Law

"The expunction statute was created to allow persons wrongfully charged to expunge their arrest records." Williams, 76 S.W.3d at 650 (citing Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Butler, 941 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ); State v. Knight, 813 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ)). Expunction is only available when all statutory conditions have been met. Id.; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.01-.02 (Vernon 2006). The petitioner has the burden of proving that all statutory requirements have been satisfied in order to be entitled to expunction. Williams, 76 S.W.3d at 650 (citing Butler, 941 S.W.2d at 321; Ex parte Scott, 818 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ)).

A petitioner, such as Olivares, who has neither been acquitted of the offense in the petition, nor convicted and subsequently pardoned, must show that each of the following conditions are met to be entitled to expunction:

(A) an indictment or information charging the person with commission of a felony has not been presented against the person for an offense arising out of the transaction for which the person was arrested or, if an indictment or information charging the person with commission of a felony was presented, the indictment or information has been dismissed or quashed, and:


(i) the limitations period expired before the date on which the petition for expunction was filed under Article 55.02; or


(ii) the court finds that the indictment or information was dismissed or quashed because the presentment had been made because of mistake, false information, or other similar reason indicating absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal to believe the person committed the offense or because it was void;

(B) the person has been released and the charge, if any, has not resulted in a final conviction and is no longer pending and there was no court ordered community supervision under Article 42.12 for any offense other than a Class C misdemeanor; and


(C) the person has not been convicted of a felony in the five years preceding the date of the arrest.


Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.01(a)(2).

C. Analysis

By its first issue, DPS contends that the trial court erred in granting Olivares's petition for expunction because Olivares presented no evidence to satisfy the statutory requirements for expunction. In response, Olivares argues that DPS is precluded from raising its no-evidence issue on appeal because (1) DPS was "bound by any representation by a party adverse to said proceeding," and, therefore, induced any purported error, and (2) DPS was required to raise its no-evidence challenge below and failed to do so. Therefore, before we reach the merits of DPS's first issue, we will first address Olivares's challenges to DPS's ability to raise its no-evidence issue on appeal.

To support his first argument, that DPS was "bound by any representation by a party adverse to said proceedings," and, therefore, induced any purported error, Olivares relies on Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Cryan, No. 14-04-00507-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 6419 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 11, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.). However, we find Cryan distinguishable from the instant case and conclude that Olivares's reliance on Cryan is without merit.

In Cryan, the district attorney appeared at the expunction hearing and argued as follows:

We did talk to the D.P.S. who filed an extensive answer [in this case]. I think he has talked to [Cryan's attorney] and talked to me. . . . The other two arrests [that did not result in deferred adjudication], we have no problem with expunging those records, but we would oppose any kind of expunction as far as the deferred adjudication is concerned at this point in time because I think, legally, it can not [sic] be done.


Based on this argument by the district attorney, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals found that the district attorney "expressly represented to the trial court that neither he, nor DPS, opposed expunction of records related to these arrests." See id. at *6 (emphasis added). In addition, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals concluded that (1) the district attorney's express representation that there was "no problem" with expunging certain records "clearly invited" error by the trial court, and (2) the district attorney, and the parties he represented at the hearing, could not inconsistently contend on appeal that the trial court erred by expunging the petitioner's records. See id. at *6-*7. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals further concluded that because DPS did not appear at the expunction hearing, the district attorney represented DPS's interests at the hearing. Id. at *7. As a result, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that "the district attorney's representation that neither he, nor DPS, opposed expunction of records . . . is binding on DPS and precludes DPS from challenging on appeal the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support expunction of records . . . ." Id. at *8.

Here, however, neither the district attorney nor DPS was present at the September 29th hearing. Although the trial court stated that "they withdrew the special exception to this case and Mr. Gonzalez came in and I told him - - he told me that there would be an agreement and that they would withdraw their special exception," it is unclear from the record who Mr. Gonzalez was. (2) In addition, it is unclear from the record what the context of any such would-be agreement was-whether it related to special exceptions, to the expunction, or to any other matter. Furthermore, other than the trial court's statement that "there would be an agreement," the record does not show an express representation of any such agreement by Mr. Gonzalez, himself; nor does the record show that Mr. Gonzalez expressly represented that DPS was part of any such agreement. Therefore, based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that (1) Mr. Gonzalez represented DPS's interest at the hearing, (2) DPS was bound by any would-be agreement, or (3) DPS invited any purported error by the trial court regarding the expunction of Olivares's arrest record. Thus, we cannot conclude that DPS is precluded from raising its no-evidence issue on this basis.

With respect to his second argument, Olivares asserts that DPS is precluded from raising its no-evidence challenge on appeal because DPS failed to raise its no-evidence challenge in the trial court. However, we conclude that Olivares's argument is without merit. First, DPS raised its no-evidence challenge in its motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. Moreover, it is well settled that when appealing from a non-jury trial, a legal sufficiency challenge may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(d) (providing that in a non-jury case, a legal sufficiency challenge may be raised for the first time on appeal in the complaining party's brief); Tex. R. Civ. P. 324(a), (b). Therefore, we conclude that DPS's no-evidence challenge is properly before this Court. Accordingly, we will now address the merits of DPS's no-evidence issue.

DPS contends that the trial court erred in granting Olivares's petition for expunction because Olivares presented no evidence to support the expunction. Specifically, DPS asserts that Olivares was required to prove that he satisfied the requirements of article 55.01(a)(2) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure in order to be entitled to expunction. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.01(a)(2). We agree.

It is well settled that the petitioner has the burden of proving that all statutory requirements have been satisfied in order to be entitled to expunction. Williams, 76 S.W.3d at 650. Because Olivares had neither been acquitted of the offense identified in the petition, nor convicted and subsequently pardoned for said offense, Olivares was required to prove that he satisfied the conditions set out in article 55.01(a)(2) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.01(a)(2). However, the record does not reflect that Olivares presented any evidence to prove satisfaction of these requirements. (3) Therefore, there is a complete absence of the vital facts necessary for Olivares to establish his entitlement to expunction. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810; see also Williams, 76 S.W.3d at 649. Thus, we conclude that there is no evidence to support Olivares's expunction and that the trial court erred in ordering Olivares's records expunged. We sustain DPS's first issue.

Having sustained DPS's first issue, we need not address DPS's second issue regarding proper notice of the hearing. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and render judgment denying the expunction. Pursuant to DPS's prayer for relief, we order any documents surrendered to the trial court or to Olivares returned to the submitting agencies. See Ex parte Elliott, 815 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam) (providing that reversal of the order of expunction applies to all respondents, even if they did not participate in the appeal).

NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ

Justice


Memorandum Opinion delivered and

filed this 26th day of July, 2007.

1. 1
We note that the trial court's docket sheet entry for September 29th shows that the October 20th expunction hearing was canceled.

2. 2
We note that neither party explains who Mr. Gonzalez might be.

3. Moreover, we note that in order to have shown his entitlement to expunction, appellee would have had to prove, among other things, that his DWI charge did not result in a final conviction and that the trial court did not order community supervision for the offense. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.01(a)(2)(C). However, appellee does not dispute that the trial court convicted him of DWI and ordered him to complete twelve months of probation. Thus, even if appellee had presented some evidence as to the other statutory requirements for expunction, he would not have been able to prove his satisfaction of article 55.01(a)(2)(C). See id.

Friday, July 13, 2007

Yeah for Carlos Valdez.........it takesprecious time to do things right


Local
Kleberg official faces inquiry
Prosecutor may have intervened on behalf of aunt facing felony

By Dan Kelley (Contact)
Originally published 12:00 a.m., July 13, 2007
Updated 04:18 a.m., July 13, 2007
Isassi suggested politics might be behind the investigation.
Isassi suggested politics might be behind the investigation.



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Alfred Isassi describes himself as a career prosecutor. Since graduating from law school in 1999, he has handled felony cases for the District Attorney's Office, and now is the elected Kleberg County attorney, where he oversees misdemeanor prosecutions.

Isassi may find himself on the other side of the courtroom. A judge has appointed a special prosecutor to investigate a nearly two-year-old allegation that Isassi intervened improperly on behalf of an aunt, Anna Gonzalez, arrested on felony perjury charges after being accused of failing to disclose an earlier theft conviction when being chosen to serve on a grand jury.

Isassi hasn't been formally notified of an investigation.

District Attorney Carlos Valdez said the investigation stems from allegations that his former employee interfered with the Kleberg County's Pretrial Services Division. After Gonzalez was arrested, Valdez said, she was released from jail but had to comply with some terms of a pretrial release program.

Isassi is accused of calling the office and asking that his aunt not be made to comply with those terms because the district attorney was not going to prosecute. Valdez added that a witness told investigators Isassi said he had talked to the DA about the case. He had not, Valdez said.

"He never talked to any of us," Valdez said. He has recused his office from the case because he and two top aides could be made to testify.

Isassi said he was not able to recall any conversation with that department regarding the matter.

Valdez, as district attorney for the 105th Judicial District, prosecutes felony cases in Nueces, Kleberg and Kenedy counties. That will change in September when Gov. Rick Perry can appoint a district attorney for Kleberg and Kenedy counties, the result of new legislation passed this year.

Isassi is seeking that appointment.

District Judge Manuel Bañales appointed Retha Cable, an assistant district attorney in San Patricio and Aransas counties, to investigate and prosecute the matter if a grand jury hands up an indictment.

She declined to comment on the case, and said she would present some evidence to a grand jury on July 19.

Noel Peña, director of the Kleberg County Supervision and Direction Department, said his office has provided statements to investigators but declined to elaborate. He said he was surprised to hear that the investigation is still ongoing.

"I'm totally surprised that something developed," Peña said.

The 2005 arrest also caused problems for Gonzalez. At the time of her arrest, she had served on a grand jury for four months. Authorities discovered she had a theft conviction, making her ineligible for grand jury service. She was charged with perjury because she hadn't disclosed the conviction. Prosecutors had to re-present about 100 cases to the grand jury, Valdez said. She now is undergoing a pretrial diversion program that could lead to dismissal of charges.

Attempts to reach Gonzalez on Thursday were unsuccessful.

It is unclear why the case has taken so long to investigate. Valdez believes Kingsville police referred the matter to a federal agency.

Peña said he was unaware of any federal investigation.

Kingsville Police Chief Ricardo Torres declined comment.

Isassi suggested politics might lay behind the investigation.

"You're talking about something that happened over two years ago," Isassi said.

Isassi had just returned from visiting a prominent Republican -- he won't say who -- in hopes that the person would intercede with Perry to secure appointment to the district attorney's office.

Kleberg County Commissioner Romeo Lomas concurs that politics could play a role in the timing of the investigation.

"I think some might be political," Lomas said, "because he's given notice to everyone in the county that he is going to run for that DA."

Contact Dan Kelley at 886-4316 or kelleyd@caller.com

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Post Your Comments

Posted by sgran77482 on July 13, 2007 at 8:46 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Valdez trying someone for perjury???That is laughable!!!

Posted by colorderosa on July 13, 2007 at 10:05 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Politics, politics, politics, the dirty, lowdown and sometimes just plain hateful, even if true or false, it will bring anyone down and the people behind this, will be the winners and will surface when they run for this position. It's just too bad it had to happen in Kleberg County, AGAIN, and as usual the press and media will milk it for all they can.

Posted by newsman on July 13, 2007 at 10:21 a.m. (Suggest removal)

It is a shame but 95% of all politicians give the rest a bad name.

Posted by dannoynted1 on July 13, 2007 at 10:55 p.m. (Suggest removal)

Hello ~technically Ms. Anna is ineligible for pre trial diversion because she has been convicted of a "crime"!

Watt did she steal? or watt "theft"?

Did she steal an egg roll?

Did she steal "Mary Cano's milk money?

or maybe she indicted people because her nephew said so.

Posted by dannoynted1 on July 13, 2007 at 11:08 p.m. (Suggest removal)

i hope Alfred hires John Kearney that way they both can be "the prosecution" darlings they worked so hard in law school for.

How does it feel?

Perry progressive Vanos

Tuesday, June 26, 2007

it would not have mattered if he had 2 affadavits or 200.......

NUMBER 13-06-087-CR


COURT OF APPEALS


THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS


CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG



MICHAEL MARTINEZ, Appellant,


v.


THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 214th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.



MEMORANDUM OPINION


Before Justices Yañez, Rodriguez, and Garza

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Yañez

A jury convicted appellant, Michael Martinez, of criminal mischief and sentenced him to two years' imprisonment. Appellant complains the trial court erroneously denied his motion for change of venue. We affirm. (1)

Discussion

Appellant contends he was denied his right to a fair trial due to the trial court's error in denying his motion for change of venue. A trial court's denial of a motion for change of venue is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (2) A trial court's decision concerning venue will not be disturbed so long as it was within the realm of reasonableness given the facts presented to the trial court. (3)

Article 31.03(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides

(a) A change of venue may be granted in any felony or misdemeanor case punishable by confinement on the written motion of the defendant, supported by his own affidavit and the affidavit of at least two credible persons, residents of the county where the prosecution is instituted. . . . (4)


At a pre-trial hearing, appellant presented his motion for change of venue to the court. Appellant's motion was supported by affidavits from two witnesses. However, the record does not reveal that the motion was supported by appellant's own affidavit as required by article 31.03. The omission of appellant's own affidavit renders the motion fatally defective. (5) When a motion is not in the proper form, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying it. (6) Thus, we conclude that appellant's motion for change of venue is defective, and the trial court did not err in denying it.

Conclusion

We overrule appellant's point of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.








LINDA REYNA YAÑEZ, Justice








Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).


Memorandum opinion delivered and filed this

the 14th day of June, 2007.

How can a jury find appellant guilty if he "pled guilty"?

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NUMBER 13-05-156-CR


COURT OF APPEALS


THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS


CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG



JONATHAN BRIDGES, Appellant,


v.


THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee.



On appeal from the 105th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.



MEMORANDUM OPINION


Before Justices Yañez, Rodriguez, and Garza

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Yañez

Appellant, Johnathan Bridges, pled guilty to the offense of possession of cocaine. A jury found appellant guilty and sentenced him to fifteen months' imprisonment. Appellant, through five issues, contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm. (1)

Standard of Review

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that trial counsel's performance was deficient and that a reasonable probability exists that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for the deficiency. (2) The first prong of the Strickland test requires that the appellant show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. (3) Thus, the defendant must prove objectively, by a preponderance of the evidence, that trial counsel's representation fell below professional standards. (4) The second prong requires that the defendant show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. (5) Under the first prong, however, a reviewing court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. (6) Any allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must demonstrate affirmatively the alleged ineffectiveness. (7)

Discussion

Appellant asserts he received ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of counsel's failure to (1) file a motion to suppress evidence, (2) obtain rulings on appellant's pretrial motions, (3) obtain a ruling on counsel's motion to withdraw, and (4) set a hearing on appellant's motion for new trial. In his fifth issue, appellant asserts that his counsel's ineffectiveness is further evidenced by counsel's own admission to ineffective assistance of counsel.

We begin by addressing appellant's fifth issue, wherein appellant complains that his counsel was ineffective by his own alleged admission to that effect in a motion for new trial. In the motion, appellant's counsel stated: "The Defendant's basis for a new trial is that he was provided with ineffective assistance of counsel. Defense Counsel files this motion on his clients [sic] behalf in order to protect the Defendant's appellate rights and asks that New Counsel be appointed to represent Mr. Bridges on appeal." The State contends that appellant's counsel "filed the motion alleging ineffective assistance as a ground in order to preserve his client's rights, he made no general or specific admissions that he was, in fact, ineffective in his representation." We agree. Because the motion does not constitute an admission and has no significance to the present allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant's fifth issue is overruled.

In issues three and four, appellant asserts that his counsel was ineffective in his post-judgment conduct. Appellant contends that this ineffectiveness delayed the appointment of new counsel, and that this delay left appellant's newly appointed counsel with little time to prepare for a hearing on appellant's motion for new trial.

With regard to post-judgment conduct, this Court has held that when the record does not show that trial counsel withdrew or was replaced by new counsel after sentencing, there is a rebuttable presumption that trial counsel continued to effectively represent the accused during the time for filing a motion for new trial. (8) The facts presented to us do not rebut this presumption. There is no evidence to show that counsel had abandoned appellant, or that appellant was not counseled by his attorney regarding the merits of a motion for new trial. Furthermore, appellant admits in his brief that he was given a hearing on his motion for new trial, but that "since Appellant could not be brought back in time from the State Jail Facility the hearing was held and said motion died by operation of law." We thus find that appellant has not presented this Court with any evidence to show that his counsel was ineffective, nor has appellant shown how any alleged ineffectiveness could have conceivably harmed him since appellant missed his hearing through no fault of his counsel. In light of appellant's inability to satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test, issues three and four are overruled.

In issues one and two--failure to file a motion to suppress and obtain rulings on pretrial motions--appellant complains of matters that occurred before his plea of guilty. A defendant who knowingly and voluntarily pleads guilty without a plea bargain agreement waives all nonjurisdictional defects that occurred before the entry of the plea. (9) Ineffective assistance of counsel is a nonjurisdictional defect. (10) An attack upon a guilty plea based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will succeed only if appellant shows that his attorney's alleged deficiencies caused his plea to be unknowing and involuntary. (11)

We first note that to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress, appellant has to prove that the trial court would have granted the motion. (12) Appellant has presented no evidence to satisfy this burden. Second, the failure to file pre-trial motions is not categorically deemed ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel may decide not to file pre-trial motions as part of his trial strategy. (13) Appellant has not rebutted this possibility with regard to his counsel's decision not to file a motion to suppress. Lastly, appellant makes no contention that any of his trial counsel's deficiencies rendered his plea unknowing or involuntary. There is no evidence that appellant would have pleaded not guilty had it not been for his counsel's alleged ineffectiveness. We find that the judgment of guilt was rendered independent of, and is not supported by, the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claimed by appellant. Appellant has thus failed to satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test; accordingly, issues one and two are overruled.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court's judgment.




LINDA REYNA YAÑEZ,

Justice






Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).


Memorandum opinion delivered and filed

this the 14th day of June, 2007.

1. As this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite them here except as necessary to explain the Court's decision and the basic reasons for it. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

2. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

3. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

4. Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

5. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812.

6. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

7. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813.

8. Jones v. State, 39 S.W.3d 691, 693 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).

9. Monreal v. State, 99 S.W.3d 615, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

10. Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

11. Santos v. State, 877 S.W.2d 15, 17 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no pet.).

12. Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam).

13. See Hammond v. State, 942 S.W.2d 703, 710 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.).